



OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission

Co-Chair

Sen. Charleta B. Tavares
Assistant Minority Leader

Co-Chair

Rep. Jonathan Dever
House District 28

Part IV

May 11, 2017

Ohio Statehouse
Room 313

Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission

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OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND VOTING COMMITTEE

OHIO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE V, SECTION 6

MENTAL CAPACITY TO VOTE

The Bill of Rights and Voting Committee of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission issues this report and recommendation regarding Article V, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution concerning the disenfranchisement of mentally incapacitated persons. It is issued pursuant to Rule 8.2 of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission's Rules of Procedure and Conduct.

Recommendation

Based on the following and for the reasons stated herein, the committee recommends that Article V, Section 6 in its current form be repealed, and that a new section be adopted as follows:

The General Assembly shall provide that no person who has been determined under law to lack the mental capacity to vote shall have the rights and privileges of an elector during the time of incapacity.

Background

Article V of the Ohio Constitution concerns the Elective Franchise.

Article V, Section 6 reads as follows:

No idiot, or insane person, shall be entitled to the privileges of an elector.

The clear purpose of the provision is to disqualify from voting persons who are mentally incapacitated. The provision modifies the broad enfranchisement of United States citizens over the age of 18 who otherwise meet the qualifications of an elector, as contained in Article V, Section 1.¹

When this provision was adopted as part of the 1851 Ohio Constitution, words such as “idiot,” “lunatic,” and “feeble-minded,” were commonly used to describe persons of diminished mental capacity. In modern times, however, the descriptors “idiot” and “insane person” have taken on a pejorative meaning and are not favored. Throughout the 1800s, an “idiot” was simply a person with diminished mental capacity, what later was termed “mental retardation,” and what is now referred to as being “developmentally disabled.” Further, the word “idiot” conveyed that it was a permanent state of mental incapacity, possibly congenital, as opposed to “mania” “dementia,” or “insanity,” which signified potentially transient or temporary conditions.² Today, the word “idiot” has become an insult, suggesting someone who is willfully foolish or uninformed.³

The use of both the word “idiot” and the phrase “insane person” in Article V, Section 6 suggests that the privileges of an elector were to be denied both to persons with permanently diminished mental capacity, as well as to persons whose condition is or could be temporary.

In one of the few cases discussing the meaning and origin of the words “idiot” and “insane persons” in this provision, the Marion County Common Pleas Court in 1968 observed:

From my review of legal literature going back to 1800 it seems apparent that the common definition of the word “idiot,” as understood in 1851 when our present Constitution was in the main adopted, meant that it refers to a person who has been without understanding from his nativity, and whom the law, therefore, presumes never likely to attain any. I am unable to find anything indicating any real change in this definition to this date. * * *

The words “insane person,” however, most commonly then as well as now, refer to a person who has suffered such a deprivation of reason that he is no longer capable of understanding and acting with discretion and judgment in the ordinary affairs of life. It seems quite apparent that some persons who once had normal reason and sense faculties become permanently insane. Others lose their normal perception and reason for relatively short periods of time such as day, a week, or a month or two, and then regain their normal condition for either their entire life or for some lesser indeterminate period. During these lucid intervals such persons commonly exercise every characteristic of normality associated with all those persons who have never, even for a short period, been deprived of their normal reasoning faculties.

Baker v. Keller, 15 Ohio Misc. 215, 229, 237 N.E.2d 629, 638 (Marion CP Ct. 1968).

Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Other Review

Article V, Section 6 has not been amended since its adoption as part of the 1851 Ohio Constitution.

In the 1970s, the Elections and Suffrage Committee (“E&S Committee”) of the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission (“1970s Commission”) discussed whether to amend the

provision in order to remove the “idiot” and “insane person” references. The E&S Committee’s discussion centered both on the words themselves, which were recognized as outdated and potentially offensive, as well as the provision’s vagueness:

The present provision concerning mental illness and voting is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, the constitutional language is simply a direct prohibition. The General Assembly is not expressly given the power to determine which mental conditions are such that a person should not vote, nor to establish procedures for determining who does or who does not fall into the categories. Statutory authority for the courts to deny the vote to involuntarily committed patients is nevertheless provided in [Ohio Revised Code] section 5122.15, dealing with legal incompetency. But this provision carries out neither the letter nor the spirit of the constitutional prohibition. The law now tolerates the voting of some persons who may in fact be mentally incompetent. A voluntary patient who does not request a hearing before the probate court retains his civil rights, among them the right to vote. The loss of the right to vote is based upon the idea that a person in need of indeterminate hospitalization is also legally incompetent. But there are other persons whose right to vote may be challenged on the basis of insanity, either at the polls or in the case of contested election results. In these instances, there are no provisions resolving how hearings must be conducted, by whom, or even the crucial question of whether medical evidence shall be required. The lack of procedure for determining who is “insane” or an “idiot” could allow persons whose opinions are unpopular or whose lifestyles are disapproved to be challenged at the polls, and they may lose their right to vote without the presentation of any medical evidence whatsoever.⁴

The E&S Committee acknowledged that “large scale and possibly arbitrary exclusion from voting are a greater danger to the democratic process than including some who may be mentally incompetent to vote.” The E&S Committee concluded that “a person should not be denied the right to vote because he is ‘incompetent,’ but only if he is incompetent for the purpose of voting,” ultimately recommending a revision that would exclude from the franchise persons who are “mentally incompetent for the purpose of voting.”⁵ The 1970s Commission voted to submit this recommendation to the General Assembly, specifically proposing repeal of the section and replacing it with a new Section 5 that would read:

The General Assembly shall have power to deny the privileges of an elector to any person adjudicated mentally incompetent for the purpose of voting only during the period of such incompetency.⁶

For reasons that are not clear, the General Assembly did not present this issue to the voters.

Litigation Involving the Provision

Only two Ohio Supreme Court cases refer to this provision. An early case, *Sinks v. Reese*, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869), cited it to support a holding that some votes by mentally-impaired residents of an asylum could be disqualified; however, the court counted a vote by a resident who was “greatly enfeebled by age,” because “the reverence which is due to ‘the hoary head’ ought to have left his vote uncontested.” The court also mentioned the provision in *State ex rel. Melvin v. Sweeney, Secy. of State*, 154 Ohio St. 223, 94 N.E.2d 785 (1950), in which the court held constitutional a statutory provision that required county boards of elections to provide ballot assistance to physically disabled voters, but prohibited them from providing similar assistance to illiterate voters.

The provision also was cited in the context of an election in which a person of diminished mental capacity was alleged to have been improperly allowed to vote. *In re South Charleston Election Contest*, 1905 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 191, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 373 (Clark County Probate Court, 1905), involved a contested election relating to the sale of liquor in which one voter was deemed by the court to be mentally incompetent for the purpose of voting, with the result that the election was so close as to be declared null and void.

Baker v. Keller, supra, a common pleas case, cited Article V, Section 6 in relation to its conclusion that a litigant could not base a motion for new trial on the allegation that a mentally ill juror should have been disqualified where there had been no adjudication of incompetence.

More recently, a Maine federal court decision has been relied on in other jurisdictions for its holding that imposition of a guardianship for mental health reasons does not equate with mental incapacity for purposes of voting. *Doe v. Rowe*, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001), concluded that federal equal protection and due process guarantees require a specific finding that an individual is mentally incompetent for the purpose of voting before disqualification can occur. *Doe v. Rowe* was cited in *Bell v. Marinko*, 235 F. Supp.2d 772 (N.D. Ohio 2002), for the proposition that, because voting is a fundamental right, disenfranchisement based on residency requirements must be predicated on notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Presentations and Resources Considered

Michael Kirkman, Disability Rights Ohio

On December 11, 2014, Michael Kirkman, executive director of Disability Rights Ohio, a legal advocacy and rights protection organization, presented to the committee on the topic of voting rights for the disabled. Mr. Kirkman attended the committee meeting again on February 12, 2015, to provide additional assistance as the committee discussed potential changes to Article V, Section 6.

According to Mr. Kirkman, society’s perception of mental disability has changed since 1851, when neglect, isolation, and segregation were typical responses. Social reform after the Civil War helped create institutions for housing and treating the mentally ill, but there was little

improvement in societal views of mental illness. Mr. Kirkman noted that, even as medical and psychiatric knowledge expanded, the mentally ill were still living in deplorable conditions and were sometimes sterilized against their will. By the 1950s, there was a growing awareness that the disabled should be afforded greater rights, with the recognition that due process requirements must be met before their personal liberties and fundamental rights could be constrained. Mr. Kirkman observed that Article V, Section 1 gives broad basic eligibility requirements for being an Ohio voter, but Article V, Section 6 constitutes the only categorical exception in that it automatically disenfranchises people with mental disabilities. Mr. Kirkman further noted the difficulty in defining “mental incapacity for the purpose of voting,” commenting that mental capacity is not fixed in time or static in relation to every situation, and that even mental health experts have difficulty defining the concept. According to Mr. Kirkman, the better practice is to make an individualized determination of decisional capacity in the specific context in which it is challenged.

Mr. Kirkman emphasized the view of the disability community that full participation in the political process is essential, and for this reason he advocated removal of Article V, Section 6, without replacement. Alternately, if Article V, Section 6 cannot be entirely eliminated, Mr. Kirkman recommended the provision should be phrased as an affirmative statement of non-discrimination, such as “No person otherwise qualified to be an elector shall be denied any of the rights or privileges of an elector because of a disability.” He also stated that the self-enabling aspect of the current provision should be changed to reflect that the General Assembly has the authority to enact laws providing due process protection for persons whose capacity to vote is subject to challenge.

In his second appearance before the committee on February 12, 2015, Mr. Kirkman commented that the phrase “mentally incompetent to vote” is not currently favored when drafting legislative enactments. Instead, he said the mental health community favors expressing the concept as a lack of mental “capacity,” or as being “mentally incapacitated.” Mr. Kirkman noted that the word “incompetent” is a purely legal term used in guardianship and criminal codes, while “mental incapacity” more specifically describes the mental state that would affect whether a person could vote.

Mr. Kirkman again appeared before the committee on November 12, 2015 to answer questions from committee members about proposed changes to the provision. Reiterating that experts dispute what is meant by “capacity to vote,” Mr. Kirkman said one way to address that question would be to include language giving the General Assembly an express role in deciding what circumstances should affect voting rights.

Huhn Presentation

On November 12, 2015, the committee heard a presentation by Wilson R. Huhn, professor emeritus at the University of Akron School of Law, who spoke on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio (“ACLU”). After describing the constitutional due process requirements relating to the right to vote, Professor Huhn advocated for removing Article V, Section 6, saying the General Assembly would still retain the ability to establish procedures for

denying the right to vote to persons who are incapable of voting. Prof. Huhn said mental health experts use methods to evaluate performance that are far more than a simple IQ test, and that people have abilities based on living skills, communication skills, and common sense.

Research Materials

The committee benefited from several memoranda that described relevant research, as well as posed questions for consideration and suggested possible changes to the section.

Staff research presented to the committee indicates that voting is a fundamental right that the United States Supreme Court calls the “essence of a democratic society.” *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 553, 555 (1964). “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). In addition, disenfranchisement is considered to be a denial of a fundamental liberty, subject to basic due process protections that ensure fundamental fairness. *Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs.*, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). In reviewing provisions affecting the exercise of the elective franchise, courts apply the balancing test in *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), by which the individual’s interest in participating in the democratic process is weighed against the state’s interest in ensuring that those who vote understand the act of voting. *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Because voting is a fundamental right, the high court has held a state’s interest in limiting its exercise must be compelling, and the limitations themselves must be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest. *See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); *Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd.*, 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008).⁷

The committee also reviewed other state constitutions that address disenfranchisement of the mentally impaired. Although nine states have no constitutional provision relating to a voter’s mental status, the remainder contain a limitation on voting rights for persons experiencing mental impairment, with three of those states having a provision that grants discretion to the state legislature to determine whether to disenfranchise. Significantly, only four states, Ohio, Kentucky, Mississippi, and New Mexico, retain the descriptors “idiots” and “insane persons,” with other states referring to such persons as being mentally incompetent, mentally incapacitated, or as having a mental disability.

Additional Resources

Research that assisted the Committee’s consideration of this issue included Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, *Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters*, 38 McGeorge L.Rev. 931 (2007); James T. McHugh, *Idiots and Insane Persons: Electoral Exclusion and Democratic Values Within the Ohio Constitution*, 76 Albany L.Rev. 2189 (2013); Kay Schriener, *The Competence Line in American Suffrage Law: A Political Analysis*, Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, page 61; Kay Schriener & Lisa A. Ochs, *Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts Disenfranchised People Under Guardianship*, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 481 (2001).

Discussion and Consideration

In reviewing possible changes to Article V, Section 6, the committee first considered whether to simply replace the offensive references with more appropriate language, leaving the rest of the section intact. However, some members emphasized the importance of additionally stating that any disenfranchisement due to lack of mental capacity must last only during the period of incapacity.

The committee also discussed whether to retain the section's "self-executing" status, or whether to include language that would specifically authorize or require the General Assembly to create laws governing the disenfranchisement of mentally incapacitated persons. On this question, some members asserted that expressly requiring or empowering the General Assembly to act was unnecessary because this legislative authority is inherent. Ultimately, it was the consensus of the committee that expressly requiring or enabling action by the General Assembly is necessary in order to acknowledge an evolving understanding of the concept of "mental capacity for the purpose of voting," and so the committee concluded that the section should include such language.

The committee also addressed what would be the appropriate descriptor for persons whose mental disability would disqualify them from voting. On this question, the committee found persuasive Michael Kirkman's assertion that the preferred modern reference is to an individual's "incapacity," rather than to his or her "incompetence." Members of the committee agreed that "mental incapacity" would be an acceptable phrase to substitute for "idiots" and "insane persons." Combined with the committee's consensus that disenfranchisement should occur only during the time of the individual's incapacity, allowing voting to be restored to persons who recover their mental capacity, the committee concluded that the appropriate phrase should be "mental incapacity to vote."

The committee also considered the significance of the use of the phrase "privileges of an elector" in the section, as opposed to using the phrase "privileges of a voter" or "rights of a voter." One committee member noted that "privileges of an elector" would not indicate merely voting, but would include activities such as running for public office or signing a petition. Further discussion centered on the symbolic or other differences between using the word "privilege" and using the word "right," as well as the inclusion of the word "entitled" in the section. Some committee members expressed a strong preference for having the new section refer to voting as a "right," a word choice they believed would signify the importance of the act of voting, and emphasize the constitution's protection of the individual's voting prerogative. Other committee members were reluctant to change the reference to "privileges of an elector," because of the possibility that the original meaning and application of that phrase would be lost. Several members acknowledged that the "privilege versus right" controversy was larger than could be thoroughly addressed or satisfactorily resolved by the committee, and that, in any case, its resolution was not necessary to revising the section.

As a compromise, the committee agreed to recommend that the phrase read “rights and privileges of an elector,” so as to embrace both the concept of voting as a right and the concept, articulated in the original language of the section, of an “elector” having privileges beyond those of simply voting.

Debate arose over whether to include an explicit reference to judicial review, due process, or adjudication, as a prerequisite to disenfranchisement. Some committee members said they were inclined to exclude the reference based on their view that due process must be satisfied regardless of whether the provision expressly mentions the need for it. These committee members indicated that a constitutional provision that expressly requires adjudication could complicate or interfere with current procedures for ascertaining whether an individual is capable of voting. Other committee members said requiring adjudication would emphasize that the burden is on the state to prove that an individual’s mental state disqualifies him or her from voting, rather than the burden being on the individual to prove sufficient mental capacity to vote. Some members sought to include language that would emphasize that voting is a right that should not be removed absent adjudication. Those members expressed the view that a constitutional provision that doesn’t express this concept is not fair to the citizen.

The committee was divided between those who wanted to include a reference to adjudication, and those who did not. As a way of addressing the issue of adjudication, the committee decided the amendment should require the General Assembly to enact laws governing the legal determination of whether a person lacks the mental capacity to vote. The committee also agreed its recommendation should focus on substituting the references to “idiots” and “insane persons” with the adjective phrase “lacks the mental capacity to vote.” The committee further concluded that the provision could recognize both the “rights” and “privileges” of an elector, and that the disenfranchisement would only be during the period of incapacity.

The Bill of Rights and Voting Committee concluded that the considerations and interests supporting the change proposed by the 1970s Commission remain relevant today. Specifically, current knowledge regarding mental illness and cognitive impairment, as well as modern distaste for adjectives like “idiot,” continue to provide justification for amending this provision.⁸

Additionally, the current provision does not require that the subject individual be mentally incapacitated for the purposes of voting. The committee concluded that, without this specific element, the current provision lacks proper protection for persons asserted to be incapable of voting due to mental disability.

In addition to these considerations, the committee acknowledged the view that voting is a right, and that an individual possesses the “privileges of an elector,” which may include the ability to sign petitions or run for public office. Thus, the committee desired the new provision to signify that it is both of these potentially separate rights or interests that are infringed when a person is determined to lack mental capacity for the purpose of voting.

Conclusion

Based on these considerations, the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee recommends that Article V, Section 6 be repealed and replaced with the following new provision:

The General Assembly shall provide that no person who has been determined under law to lack the mental capacity to vote shall have the rights and privileges of an elector during the time of incapacity.

The recommended amendment serves the goal of:

- Requiring the General Assembly to enact laws relating to the disenfranchisement of persons lacking the mental capacity to vote;
- Removing all outdated or pejorative references to mentally incapacitated persons;
- Specifying that the disenfranchisement only applies to the period of incapacity; and
- Requiring that only mental incapacity *for the purposes of voting* would result in disenfranchisement.

Date Issued

After considering this report and recommendation on September 10, 2015, November 12, 2015, and March 10, 2016, the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee voted to issue this report and recommendation on March 10, 2016.

Endnotes

¹ Article V, Section 1 provides:

Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen years, who has been a resident of the state, county, township, or ward, such time as may be provided by law, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, has the qualifications of an elector, and is entitled to vote at all elections. Any elector who fails to vote in at least one election during any period of four consecutive years shall cease to be an elector unless he again registers to vote.

² Although the discipline of psychology was in its infancy in the 1800s, the Ohio Supreme Court's description of insanity in 1843 reflects a surprisingly modern view:

*** [I]t should be remembered that "insanity is a disease of the mind, which assumes as many and various forms as there are shades of difference in the human character. It exists in all imaginable varieties, and in such a manner as to render futile any attempt to give a classification of its numerous grades and degrees that would be of much service, or, under any circumstances, safe to be relied upon in judicial investigations. It is an undoubted fact, that, in determining a question of lunacy, the common sense of mankind must ultimately be relied on, and, in the decision, much assistance cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations, although a general knowledge of the faculties of the human mind, and their mode of operations, will be of great service in leading to correct conclusions. *Clark v. State*, 12 Ohio 483 (Ohio 1843), quoting Shelford on Lunacy, 38.

A full citation to “Shelford on Lunacy” is Leonard Shelford, *A Practical Treatise on The Law Concerning Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons of Unsound Mind, with an Appendix of The Statutes of England, Ireland, and Scotland, Relating to Such Persons and Precedents and Bills of Costs* (London, Wm. McDowall. 1833).

³ See Merriam Webster Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idiot> (1. *usually offensive*: a person affected with extreme mental retardation; 2. a foolish or stupid person). For further discussion of 19th century scientific and political views on the subject of disenfranchisement of the mentally incompetent, see Kay Schriener, *The Competence Line in American Suffrage Law: A Political Analysis*, 22 *Disability Stud. Q.*, no. 2, 2002, at 61; and Kay Schriener and Lisa A. Ochs, *Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts Disenfranchised People Under Guardianship*, 62 *Ohio St. L.J.* 481 (2001).

⁴ Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission (1970-77), Proceedings Research, Volume 5, Elections and Suffrage Committee Report, 2502, 2515 (Apr. 22, 1974), <http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/ocrc/v5%20pgs%20195-2601%20elections-suffrage%202602-2743%20local%20govt.pdf> (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).

⁵*Id.* at 2516.

⁶ Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission (1970-77), Recommendations for Amendments to the Constitution, Part 7, Elections and Suffrage, 23-25 (Mar. 15, 1975) <http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/ocrc/recommendations%20pt7%20elections%20and%20suffrage.pdf> (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).

⁷ A discussion of Due Process and Equal Protection jurisprudence related to state constitutional provisions that disenfranchise the mentally impaired may be found in Jennifer A. Bindel, *Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the Voting Rights of Persons with Diminished Mental Capacities*, 65 *N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L.* 87 (2009).

⁸ Since the 1970s, the General Assembly has undertaken efforts to purge the Ohio Revised Code of outdated or pejorative references to persons having diminished mental capacity, and to protect the civil rights of persons subject to guardianships. Thus, Am. Sub. H.B. 53, introduced and passed by the 127th General Assembly, removed all statutory references to “lunatic,” “idiot,” “imbecile,” “drunkard,” “deaf and dumb,” and “insane,” in 29 sections of the Revised Code, replacing them, where necessary, with more modern references.

Co-Chair
Charleta B. Tavares
Assistant Minority Leader
15th Senate District



Co-Chair
Ron Amstutz
Speaker Pro Tempore
1st House District

OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

MINUTES FOR THE MEETING HELD THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2016

Call to Order:

Co-chair Charleta Tavares called the meeting of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission (“Commission”) to order at 1:39 p.m.

Members Present:

A quorum was present with Commission Co-chairs Tavares and Amstutz, and Commission members Asher, Beckett, Brooks, Clyde, Cole, Coley, Cupp, Curtin, Fischer, Gilbert, Jacobson, Jordan, Kurfess, McColley, Mills, Mulvihill, Peterson, Readler, Sapphire, Sawyer, Skindell, Sykes, Taft, and Trafford in attendance.

Approval of Minutes:

The minutes of the March 10, 2016 meeting of the Commission were reviewed and approved.

Standing Committee Reports:

Coordinating Committee

Kathleen Trafford, chair of the Coordinating Committee, reported that earlier in the day the committee took up a report and recommendation from the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee on Article V, Section 6 (Mental Capacity to Vote). Complimenting both the presentation by Richard Sapphire and the report and recommendation of his committee, Ms. Trafford noted the role of the Coordinating Committee is to review form rather than substance. She said her committee unanimously approved the report and recommendation, which she said is now ready to be considered by the full Commission.

Subject Matter Committee Reports:

Education, Public Institutions, and Local Government Committee

Chad Readler, chair of the Education, Public Institutions, and Local Government Committee, reported the committee met that morning to begin its review of Article VI, Section 6, relating to

the Ohio Tuition Trust Authority, as well as to further discuss Article VI, Section 4, providing for a state school board and appointment of a state superintendent of public instruction. He said the committee heard a presentation regarding Ohio's college savings plans, as well as hearing a presentation by the Ohio Education Association relating to the selection and makeup of the state school board. With regard to Article VI, Section 4, he said the committee has heard significant testimony over the past several meetings, and has a sense the state board could be functioning in a better capacity. Mr. Readler noted the committee is considering a change that would empower the legislature to better equip the state board to address modern educational concerns. He said the committee is not near a proposal, but he is confident members can agree to something in the future.

Finance, Taxation, and Economic Development Committee

Doug Cole, chair of the Finance, Taxation, and Economic Development Committee, reported the committee has now had a second reading and vote on a report and recommendation addressing sections of Article VIII specifically providing for bonding authority that has now lapsed. He said the committee unanimously voted to issue that report and recommendation, and had a first reading of two other reports and recommendations relating to Article VIII, Sections 1 through 3, and Sections 7 through 11. He said because all three reports and recommendations are interrelated, the committee's current plan is to present them as a package. He said the committee will have a special meeting next month in order to have a second reading and potentially vote on the two remaining reports and recommendations.

Bill of Rights and Voting Committee

Richard Saphire, chair of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, reported the committee will meet next month, at which time he expects the committee to begin its review of Article V, Section 1, relating to the general qualifications for a person to be an elector in Ohio. He said he also expects the committee to begin considering whether to provide a right to privacy in the Ohio Constitution.

Constitutional Revision and Updating Committee

Dennis Mulvihill, reporting as chair of the Constitutional Revision and Updating Committee, said the committee has not met since last month, and so his March 2016 report will stand.

Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee

Fred Mills, chair of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee, said his committee would be meeting later in the day to continue its consideration of a proposal to reform the Congressional redistricting process. He said the committee would not be voting on a report and recommendation yet, but that there continues to be progress in the discussions of interested parties, both officially in a subcommittee, and in a working group. He said he is cautiously optimistic that the committee will be able to issue a report and recommendation, but does not have a time frame. He said the committee also would be reviewing an outline of how to address all the other provisions in Article II. He said he expects the committee will be able to start tackling the rest of Article II as it moves forward.

Reports and Recommendations:

Article V, Section 6 (Mental Capacity to Vote)

Co-chair Tavares recognized Richard Saphire, chair of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, who provided a first presentation of a report and recommendation issued by the committee on Article V, Section 6 (Mental Capacity to Vote). Mr. Saphire reviewed the contents of the report and recommendation, explaining the history of the provision, which, in its current form, disenfranchises “idiots” and “insane persons.” Mr. Saphire said the committee easily reached consensus that those descriptors were outdated and offensive, but members were divided on whether to retain any provision disqualifying mentally impaired voters, and also were divided on what replacement language should say. Mr. Saphire said the majority of the committee wanted to emphasize that, if disenfranchisement occurs, it must be as a result of procedures enacted by the General Assembly. Thus, he said, a majority of the committee agreed that Article V, Section 6 should be repealed and replaced by language stating:

The General Assembly shall provide that no person who has been determined under law to lack the mental capacity to vote shall have the rights and privileges of an elector during the time of incapacity.

Co-chair Tavares thanked Mr. Saphire for his report, asking for public comment. There being none, she then asked for discussion by Commission members.

Senator Michael Skindell, a member of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, commended the committee for spending “an incredible amount of time” on the issue, specifically recognizing committee members Karla Bell and Jeff Jacobson, as well as Mr. Saphire. However, he emphasized, the committee’s vote was not unanimous, a fact that should have been reflected in the report and recommendation. He said two committee members were absent for the vote, him being one of them for the reason that his presence was required at a Senate committee meeting. He said four members had concerns about the final outcome of the committee’s deliberations, and would like the opportunity to present a dissenting statement.

Commission member Ed Gilbert, also a member of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, said he echoes the concerns expressed by Sen. Skindell. He said he does not think the phrase “under law” in the committee’s proposed language is sufficiently clear. He also questioned the meaning of the phrase “during the time of incapacity.” He said he agrees with the recommendation of Michael Kirkman, executive director of Disability Rights Ohio, who had presented to the committee, which was that Article V, Section 6 should be repealed without replacement language. Mr. Gilbert also questioned why the report and recommendation did not discuss a conflict with the Americans With Disabilities Act.

Commission member Chad Readler noted the hard work of the committee that is apparent in the content of the report and recommendation, but asked why the committee chose to require the General Assembly to act, noting such language generally is not needed.

Mr. Saphire answered that a similar question arose in the Coordinating Committee’s review of the report and recommendation, and that he does not necessarily disagree. However, he said, the

committee, in part, was trying to draft language that would mirror Article V, Section 4, which states that “The General Assembly shall have power to exclude from the privilege of voting, or of being eligible to office, any person convicted of a felony.”

Commission member Doug Cole, also a member of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, noted that if the introductory part of the proposed language were stricken, members of the committee were concerned that it would be interpreted as leaving the decision solely to the courts rather than requiring a statutory framework for disenfranchising.

Mr. Readler asked “wouldn’t judicial structure track statute?”

Mr. Cole answered that the goal was to ensure the provision is not self-executing, so that there would be a role for the General Assembly to play in passing statutes.

Mr. Readler said he is more concerned about consistency throughout the constitution.

Commission member Jeff Jacobson, also a member of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, said the committee was trying to avoid the conclusion that only a court could decide what constitutes mental incapacity to vote, instead wanting to allow the General Assembly to decide the appropriate process. He said, at the same time, they did not want to leave it open so that a poll worker could decide it. He said the purpose of using “under law” was not to say “under statutory law” but to avoid disenfranchisement being an arbitrary decision.

Mr. Saphire said the committee considered at least six other ways to phrase it, but the language in the report and recommendation was what a majority of the committee agreed to.

There being no further comments, Co-chair Tavares requested staff to research the question proposed regarding the use of “under law,” and the issue of whether the provision should require the General Assembly to enact law. She said the report and recommendation would be presented and discussed a second time at the next meeting on May 12, 2016. She asked Commission members whether there are any speakers on the topic they would like to hear from.

Sen. Skindell noted a concern of the full Commission from the beginning is how to ensure the public is fully aware of the activities of the Commission so as to have an opportunity to provide input.

Co-chair Tavares asked whether there are organizations that Sen. Skindell recommends be invited to give comment. Sen. Skindell said he would give the question some thought and report back.

Representative Bob Cupp asked whether the report and recommendation lists the various formulations of the language that were considered by the committee. Steven C. Hollon, executive director, said the report and recommendation does not provide that information but that it could be disseminated to all of the Commission members by electronic mail.

Mr. Gilbert noted there are large organizations that the Commission should reach out to for input on this question. He observed that Mr. Kirkman had come to the committee meeting several times, and may have additional comments.

Commission member Charles Kurfess wondered if there should be some reference in Article V, Section 1 to Section 6 because, taking Section 1 at face value, there is some inconsistency between the two sections. He added he has a preference toward dealing with the issue in a positive rather than a negative way, thus making the presumption be that all persons over age 18 have the ability to vote, and that all persons having the mental capacity can vote, rather than that persons without the mental capacity cannot vote.

Related to Mr. Kurfess' comment, Mr. Cole noted that Article V, Section 1 creates a background rule, and then Section 6 carves out an exception. He said it is hard to state Section 6 positively because the positive rule is that everyone can vote. He said one concern is that if the background is everyone can vote, and there is no rule, then the mentally incapacitated can vote.

Mr. Jacobson said committee members "wore ourselves down looking for better alternatives." He said they had some principles on which there was consensus, and they were trying to draft according to that. He asked whether, for issues like this one, whether it is fruitful to have discussions in the Commission in which alternative language is considered.

Commission member Patrick Fischer, also a Bill of Rights and Voting Committee member, said all the issues were raised and discussed extensively in the committee, which is where that discussion belongs. He said "this commission cannot become a committee of the whole each time we bring a topic before you." He observed the current language needs to change, but that the Commission could spend another 16 to 18 months debating the same thing. He emphasized the importance of moving forward, one way or another.

Mr. Saphire agreed with Judge Fischer, saying all the points raised were discussed in the committee. He said there was plenty of opportunity to recommend people to come talk. He said the committee's responsibility is to give a proposal reflecting its best judgment, that the Commission then decides if it wants to accept the proposal. He said if the Commission wants to send the report and recommendation back, that is its prerogative, but he cannot say that the committee would come up with anything different or better than what is currently before the Commission.

Executive Director's Report:

Co-chair Tavares then recognized Mr. Hollon for his report. Mr. Hollon said the Commission has continued its efforts to publicize its activities around the state. He said, in March, Commission member Mark Wagoner, Senior Policy Advisor Steven H. Steinglass, Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and Mr. Hollon presented at the University of Toledo College of Law. He said an additional March presentation was given by Mr. Saphire, Governor Bob Taft, and Mr. Hollon at the University of Dayton. He said both of these presentations were well-received.

Adjournment:

With no further business to come before the Commission, the meeting adjourned at 2:27 p.m.

Approval:

The minutes of the April 14, 2016 meeting of the Commission were approved at the May 12, 2016 meeting of the Commission.

/s/ Charleta B. Tavares

Co-chair
Senator Charleta B. Tavares
Assistant Minority Leader

/s/ Ron Amstutz

Co-chair
Representative Ron Amstutz
Speaker Pro Tempore

Co-Chair
Charleta B. Tavares
Assistant Minority Leader
15th Senate District



Co-Chair
Ron Amstutz
Speaker Pro Tempore
1st House District

OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

MINUTES FOR THE MEETING HELD THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2016

Call to Order:

Co-chair Ron Amstutz called the meeting of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission ("Commission") to order at 1:38 p.m.

Members Present:

A quorum was present with Commission Co-chairs Tavares and Amstutz, and Commission members Abaray, Asher, Beckett, Bell, Clyde, Cole, Coley, Cupp, Curtin, Fischer, Gilbert, Jacobson, Jordan, Kurfess, McColley, Mills, Mulvihill, Readler, Sapphire, Sawyer, Skindell, Sykes, Taft, Talley, and Wagoner in attendance.

Approval of Minutes:

The minutes of the April 14, 2016 meeting of the Commission were reviewed and approved.

Standing Committee Reports:

Organization and Administration Committee

Mark Wagoner, chair of the Organization and Administration Committee, provided the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission's third quarter budget report. He indicated the Commission has paid out 67 percent of its annual budget of \$600,000. With \$150,000 carried over from the last fiscal year, Mr. Wagoner said the Commission only expended a little more than 54 percent of its budget. He said the greatest percentage of spending was for supplies and maintenance, with \$24,000 out of \$34,000 spent. He said the least percentage of spending was for payroll, at 66 percent, roughly \$318,000. He said the Commission is \$44,000 under budget in the first three quarters, and \$190,000 under budget when including the carry over. Mr. Wagoner commended Steven C. Hollon, executive director, and staff for "running a tight ship." He said Mr. Hollon presented on the Commission's work before the Sunset Review Committee, and that his presentation was well-received.

Subject Matter Committee Reports:

Education, Public Institutions, and Local Government Committee

Chad Readler, chair of the Education, Public Institutions, and Local Government Committee, reported the committee met last month, discussing Article VI, Section 4, relating to the state board of education and superintendent of public instruction. He said the committee may have recommendations for change and will take that subject up again at its next meeting. He noted also, at the next meeting, Senator Bill Coley will present regarding casinos in the state constitution.

Finance, Taxation, and Economic Development Committee

Doug Cole, chair of the Finance, Taxation, and Economic Development Committee, reported the committee held a special meeting that morning, at which it approved two reports and recommendations. He said the committee now has three reports and recommendations regarding Article VIII to go to the Coordinating Committee for its approval. He said the committee is nearing the end of its work on Article VIII and will be turning to the other articles in the coming months.

Judicial Branch and Administration of Justice Committee

Janet Abaray, chair of the Judicial Branch and Administration of Justice Committee, said her committee did not meet last month, but next month has arranged to hear a speaker on the topic of the grand jury system in Hawaii, which has aspects that may be of interest in the committee's consideration of whether to recommend changes to Ohio's system.

Bill of Rights and Voting Committee

Richard Saphire, chair of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, reported the committee met earlier, and began its review of Article V, Section 1, relating to the qualifications of an elector. He said the committee heard presentations by Carrie L. Davis, with the League of Women Voters of Ohio, and by Representative Alicia Reece. He said the committee will continue that discussion at its next meeting.

Constitutional Revision and Updating Committee

Dennis Mulvhill, reporting as chair of the Constitutional Revision and Updating Committee, said the committee is continuing its work on the statutory initiative, with a goal of encouraging citizens who want to initiate law to take the statutory, rather than the constitutional, route. He said the committee is working on rewrites of Article II, Sections 1b and 1g, removing the supplemental petition requirement and resolving conflicts if multiple similar petitions result in ballot issues. He said the committee will progress to addressing the constitutional initiative, and is picking up steam and may be reaching consensus soon on these issues.

Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee

Fred Mills, chair of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee, said his committee would be meeting later to again discuss Congressional redistricting and get an update on efforts to reform that process. He said the committee next would be beginning a methodical review of other assigned sections of Article II.

Reports and Recommendations:

Article V, Section 6 (Mental Capacity to Vote)

Co-chair Amstutz then recognized Richard Sapphire, chair of the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee, for a second presentation on Article V, Section 6 (Mental Capacity to Vote).

Mr. Sapphire reviewed the contents of the report and recommendation, which currently provides language disenfranchising “idiots” and “insane persons.” Mr. Sapphire said the committee agreed those descriptors are offensive, but members engaged in extensive discussion regarding whether the constitution should include a provision disqualifying mentally impaired voters, and whether, if such a provision is retained, what the replacement language should say. Mr. Sapphire said the majority of the committee wanted to emphasize that, if disenfranchisement occurs, it must be as a result of procedures enacted by the General Assembly. Thus, he said, a majority of the committee agreed that Article V, Section 6 should be repealed and replaced by language stating:

The General Assembly shall provide that no person who has been determined under law to lack the mental capacity to vote shall have the rights and privileges of an elector during the time of incapacity.

Co-chair Amstutz then recognized Senator Michael Skindell, a member of the Commission, who submitted written comments in opposition to the report and recommendation on behalf of himself and Representative Kathleen Clyde.

Sen. Skindell indicated that he and Rep. Clyde agree that the reference to “idiots” and “insane persons” in the section should be repealed, but said they oppose the language recommended by the Bill of Rights and Voting Committee. He said, by denying such persons “the privileges of an elector,” the section not only denies an individual of the fundamental right to vote but also denies individuals all other privileges as an elector. He said Section 6 not only denies the fundamental right to vote, but the ability to run as a candidate, be a signatory on a candidate or issue petition, or to hold public office.

Sen. Skindell noted the contemporary view of the United States Supreme Court is that the right to vote is not to be abridged by the states except in rare circumstances, and so the denial of this right can only be accomplished through laws that are narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Thus, he said, there is no need to replace the existing language. Citing Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3599, he said statutory law makes it illegal for a person to vote for another who cannot knowingly and voluntarily cast a vote. Sen. Skindell indicated that if the related statutory

provisions are not sufficient to protect against someone voting for another, the General Assembly can strengthen those provisions without causing conflict with the Ohio Constitution. He indicated that some 15 states do not have constitutional provisions disenfranchising such persons, and that he and Rep. Clyde prefer that the section be repealed and not replaced.

Sen. Skindell said if the Commission's consensus is to replace the existing language, then it should only be replaced with a requirement that disenfranchisement only occur after an adjudication. He said this is the approach taken by the Constitutional Revision Commission in 1975, which recommended the following language:

The General Assembly shall have power to deny the privileges of an elector to any person adjudicated mentally incompetent for the purpose of voting only during the period of such incompetency.

Sen. Skindell said, at the time, the Commission opined that "adjudication" was an adequate safeguard to ensure that people were not improperly denied the right to vote, but noted that some scholars opine that such an adjudication provision cannot withstand strict scrutiny.

Co-chair Amstutz then opened the floor for discussion by Commission members.

Commission member Ed Gilbert said he joins with Sen. Skindell on this alternative course of action. He said he was vocal in the committee, saying that the provision should be repealed, but as a compromise, he would agree to the replacement language Sen. Skindell proposed.

Commission member Janet Abaray asked what was the thought of the committee if the proposed section were adopted but the General Assembly would fail to act to create legislation on this issue. Commission member, and Bill of Rights and Voting Committee Vice-chair, Jeff Jacobson said in that case it would not be possible to disenfranchise anyone. He said that is why the committee used the phrase "under law" in its recommendation. He said there are plenty of provisions in the constitution that give the General Assembly the right to decide, with the idea that a court can come along and invalidate that provision. The General Assembly has to write a law and only under that law could someone be disenfranchised. He said "nothing in what we are proposing changes that, but it does remove the offensive language."

Commenting on Ms. Abaray's question, Mr. Saphire said that same question was directed to him by the Coordinating Committee, saying he agrees with Mr. Jacobson's analysis. He said it is his understanding that, as things now stand, the only way someone can be disenfranchised is through a procedure established for involuntarily committing someone to a mental institution. He said, to the extent that is true, then it is the case that if the General Assembly does not act there is no self-executing provision.

Sen. Skindell said the focus should not be on the person with the disability. He said, as mentioned by Michael Kirkman, executive director of Disability Rights Ohio, the focus should be on the basis of voting. He said, if a person is at such a level of mental incapacity that another must vote for him, he is no longer voluntarily voting. Sen. Skindell said the focus of the discussion is to repeal the archaic language, and then to make sure someone is not improperly voting for someone else. But, he said, "we already have laws about that. If the General

Assembly needs to make adjustments it should be done that way.” He added, if someone fills out a ballot for such a person, that is election fraud. He said “we should ensure that all people have a role in our process of democracy.”

Mr. Jacobson commented that where this issue is most likely to arise is not in the polling place, but when pollworkers go to nursing homes to assist residents. He said, as a former party chairman he got reports that generally one representative from each party would try their best to assist the person in casting a vote, including asking questions and trying to record what the answers to the questions were. To the extent to which elections can be contested, the pollworkers would disagree about the response of the voter. He said “it is a messy part of democracy, but what this proposed replacement section would do is make sure the pollworkers can’t decide on their own that the person is not capable of voting.” He noted the concerns raised by Sen. Skindell are not the issue. He said this is not a situation of someone attempting to cheat but with a situation in which the pollworkers are deciding what to do. He said the committee’s recommended language “lets us get this unhappy issue out of Ohio’s constitution in a way that allows for a compromise going forward.”

Commission member Karla Bell said, to Mr. Jacobson, that he had indicated the pollworkers could be the ones to determine mental capacity. But, she said there is no limitation in this language; the General Assembly could specify that pollworkers could make that determination.

Mr. Jacobson said the General Assembly could write all kinds of laws, but the General Assembly is not the ultimate arbiter of that question. He said the committee is saying that, like other provisions of Ohio law, the General Assembly should decide and let the courts determine if the way the law is written protects people’s rights.

Ms. Bell said the only way there is judicial resolution is if a pollworker disenfranchises and the voter is willing to sue. She said, it puts the burden on the person denying the vote.

Mr. Jacobson said there is already this question in election law, and there is ongoing litigation about these types of issues.

Commission member Pat Fischer said “I beg you, let’s move forward. The language is a compromise; it is a compromise that works” He asked “what we are doing if we continue to debate this word for word? The language from the 1970s group has sat there for 40 years, if it was so great, why has nothing happened?” He said the current language is insulting, and must be removed, but has to be replaced with something. He said “If we can’t push through our first legitimate change after that much scrutiny then we are not doing a very good job. I heartily ask you to support the report and recommendation of the committee.”

Commission member Charles Kurfess noted there are two different approaches in the current recommendation versus the recommendation from 40 years ago. He said the present language attempts to require action by the General Assembly, while the 1970s language says legislative action is discretionary. He asked whether, under the current recommended language, the legislature could simply say as a matter of law those who are patients or residents are determined to be incapable of voting.

Ms. Bell answered that, presently, Ohio law provides that if someone has been committed involuntarily, that person's right to vote cannot be eliminated without a separate determination that they are incapable of voting. That finding itself is not enough.

Mr. Sapphire agreed, saying, as a 40-year civil liberties lawyer, if the legislature did that it would be clearly unconstitutional.

Mr. Jacobson said Ohio has had this provision for 100 years or more, but there appear to be no cases that have ever arisen where people have raised objections to the process or been deprived or come to the level where they had to deal with a deprivation of rights. He said, while this is a good theoretical argument, the issue of how to fix it is a solution in search of a problem. He concluded the problem is the offensive language.

Representative Emilia Sykes commented that if a recommendation is not the position or the goal of the full Commission, "it is not fair to say just because a committee has done work the Commission has to rubber stamp it." She added, the goal is to get rid of offensive language but it is also offensive to remove someone's right to vote. She said, if this has not been an issue for over 100 years, why not get rid of the language?

Mr. Gilbert said he joined Rep. Sykes in this statement.

Mr. Sapphire said while he agrees with Rep. Sykes that the Commission is not bound by the committee's decision, from the committee's point of view this became a case of "the perfect becoming an enemy of the good." He said the committee spent hours on this, reviewing 15 or 20 different draft proposals. He said this is the best that the group can come up with; if the Commission can do better then do so.

Ms. Abaray asked whether, if this provision is repealed, would it be unconstitutional for the legislature to enact laws.

Mr. Sapphire said yes, because Article V, Section 1 provides the only other definition of "qualifications of an elector."

Mr. Wagoner said the issue goes to an elector and not just to voting. He asked what the committee's consideration was regarding holding public office.

Mr. Sapphire said this was discussed and is covered in the report and recommendation. He said he is not sure the committee reached a conclusive final assessment of it. He said, it is possible that if this provision is adopted and the General Assembly enacts a provision that is applied to disqualify a person from voting because of lack of capacity, if that person is also a public office holder someone may remove them from office.

Co-chair Amstutz said the proposed language provides the opportunity to put a conditional hold on the privileges of an elector as opposed to a disqualification. So, he said, he feels comfortable that the range applies to all the duties of an elector not just to voting.

Co-chair Tavares said those comments give her pause, since “you can’t take someone out of office and put them back in. If you said a person is no longer a qualified elector and all of those privileges go away, you may not know how long that period is.”

Commission member Herb Asher wondered, if the need for this provision is that, without it, the legislature would not be able to address the issue of voting, could the provision be limited to voting and not the broader “privileges of an elector.”

Mr. Wagoner noted that is what the 1970s Commission was proposing.

Mr. Jacobson disagreed that removing “privileges of an elector” would bring the current proposal in line with the 1970s recommendation. He said the issue was discussed in the committee, and that it was concluded that the phrase “privileges of an elector” was important to retain.

Sen. Skindell said he had asked Professor Wilson Huhn, when he presented to the committee, whether using the phrase “mental capacity to vote” broadened the category of individuals who are being excluded from the rights and privileges of an elector, as versus the words “idiots” and “insane persons.” He said Professor Huhn said that is a broader category, and that the provision would be adding people who could be disenfranchised. Sen. Skindell said Professor Huhn raised multiple times this impact of using the phrase “privileges of an elector.” Sen. Skindell said someone who loses the qualifications of an elector for a temporary amount of time would lose his public office, and could not regain that office when he regains that capacity.

Mr. Jacobson noted the Americans with Disabilities Act indicates a person could not be removed from office in that way.

Co-chair Amstutz thanked the Commission for its discussion and asked if there is a motion. Mr. Jacobson moved to adopt the report and recommendation for Article V, Section 6, with Judge Fischer seconding the motion.

Mr. Mills asked whether Commission members who have left the meeting have the ability to vote later under Commission rules. Co-chair Amstutz said he was not aware of such a rule, but said this could be decided later if the vote is close.

Co-chair Amstutz then called for a roll call vote, which was as follows:

Co-chair Tavares – nay
 Co-chair Amstutz – yea
 Abaray – yea
 Asher – yea
 Beckett – yea
 Bell – nay
 Brooks – absent
 Clyde – nay
 Cole – absent
 Coley – yea
 Cupp – yea

Curtin – yea
 Davidson – absent
 Fischer – yea
 Gilbert – nay
 Jacobson – yea
 Jordan – yea
 Kurfess – yea
 Macon – absent
 McColley – yea
 Mills – yea
 Mulvihill – yea
 Peterson – absent
 Readler – yea
 Sapphire – yea
 Sawyer – nay
 Skindell – nay
 Sykes – nay
 Taft – yea
 Talley – nay
 Trafford – absent
 Wagoner – yea

Requiring a vote of 22 votes to pass, the motion failed, by a vote of 18 in favor, 8 opposed, with six absent.

Co-chair Amstutz said the motion did not pass and that the matter is not recommended at this time.

Adjournment:

With no further business to come before the Commission, the meeting adjourned at 2:53 p.m.

Approval:

The minutes of the May 12, 2016 meeting of the Commission were approved at the June 9, 2016 meeting of the Commission.

/s/ Charleta B. Tavares

Co-chair
 Senator Charleta B. Tavares
 Assistant Minority Leader

/s/ Ron Amstutz

Co-chair
 Representative Ron Amstutz
 Speaker Pro Tempore

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OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

2017 Meeting Dates

June 8

July 13

August 10

September 14

October 12

November 9

December 14